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METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION

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MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABORPRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNIONAPPEALING TO MATERIALISTIC DRIVES BY VARIOUS TYPES OF REMUNERATIONPiece Wages and Increase of ProductivityPart 2Progressive Piece Wages

Contrary to simple piece wages, which provide the same rate of pay for each finished product or phase of work regardless of the number produced, progressive piece wages provide differing rates which increase relative to the amount of output, the progression starting when a certain predetermined phase in the fulfillment of the quota has been reached. Two illustrations follow:

Example from a Coal Mine in the Donets Basin:

(Normal haul per miner and shift: 10 tons of coal; wages per scale: 4 rubles per ton; haul in excess of quota: 10 percent)

The system of progressive piece wages employed in the Soviet Union will result in the following computation of wages:

	Amount in Tons	Piece wage rates per Ton in Rubles	Total Wages in Rubles
1	1.0 - 8.0	4.0	32.0
2	9.0 10.0	8.0	16.0
3	11.0	12.0	12.0
		TOTAL	60.0 rubles

(Quoted from A. Stepanov, loco citato, page 16)

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Example from the Metallurgical Industry:

(Presume the monthly quota for a lathe turner to be 2,500 bushings;
piece wage per unit: 0.20 rubles; excess of quota up to 10 percent:

100 percent bonus; excess of quota by more than 10 percent:

200 percent bonus for the entire excess over 10 percent)

Suppose this lathe worker turns out 3,000 pieces a month;
he then will receive the following wages:

2,500 pieces at 0.2 rubles: 500.0 rubles

500 pieces at 0.6 rubles: 300.0 rubles

TOTAL 800.0 rubles

(Quoted from A. Stepanov, l. c. page 17 continued)

The bonus for exceeding the quota is not everywhere as high
as in these illustrations. Other scales of progression ~~prescribe~~
the following percentages as bonus payments:

From one to 10 percent overfulfillment	30% bonus
from 10% to 25 percent overfulfillment	50% bonus
from 25% to 40 percent overfulfillment	75% bonus
from 40% and more percent overfulfillment	100% bonus

The number of steps and the intervals between the steps are
determined by the highest bonus that can be granted without unduly
raising production costs on the one hand; and by the efforts that
are being made to offer the greatest incentives possible for an
increase of productivity on the other.

It is the contention of Soviet leaders that a scale providing
only one pay increase will not offer sufficient incentive to the

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worker to exceed the quota further. Nor will too many step increases serve this purpose because in that case, the intervals between the individual steps diminish as the number of steps increases, thus likewise reducing the incentive to the worker to progress from one round of exceeding the quota to the next. The principle of increasing productivity through progressive wages is strikingly expressed in the fact that as the basic norm for setting the target of output "not the quota in force at a given time but the quota actually being fulfilled at that time must be applied. Accordingly, the basic norm is, as a rule, higher than the quota in force at any given time."

(D. Fisch, l.c., page 171)

Taking into account the fact that progressive quotas of output are used as the basis for establishing the norms, and considering also that those norms in turn will be found unsatisfactory and will again be revised upward, it becomes evident that any attempt to exceed those upgraded norms must in the end lead inevitably to exhaustion of the workers. Whether the higher remunerations which may be entered on the credit side for the system of progressive piece wages do indeed balance the losses in the very substance of the labor force, must remain an open question. Alluring as the high wages may seem to the worker who is to be spurred by them to put in his supreme effort, the disadvantages inherent in this system should not be disregarded; they threaten not only those immediately concerned, but also the rest of the workers, since in this way the standards of work will be steadily pushed up while the wages diminish proportionately.

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RESTRICTEDBonuses and Increase of Productivity

Bonuses are paid in situations where it is not possible to measure real output. A repair gang, for instance, receives a bonus combined with its time wages if the men succeed in lowering the estimated loss of output by painstaking maintenance of the machines; a lubrication team will receive a bonus for thrifty and efficient use of the lubricants, etc. In connection with bonus wages, the necessity of increasing output is likewise specifically stressed, the emphasis being on reducing the number of time wage earners, which reduction is in itself a reason for granting a bonus.

"Thus, bonuses become an important means in the struggle for complete exploitation of production potential, for reduction of labor costs, for saving of raw and industrial materials and capital."

(A. Lyapin: The Socialist Principle of Distribution According to Production. Moscow 1949, page 20)

Bonuses are distributed not only to workers; all other employees may receive them too. Bookkeepers, for instance, will receive a bonus payment for an early completion of the accounts. Well-known are the so-called Stalin Prizes which are granted to physicians, inventors, artists, Stakhanovites and others for outstanding performances; the prizes may range from 50,000 to 200,000 rubles. According to Die Tägliche Rundschau of 7 March 1950, 1,285 persons will receive prizes for 1949.

However, the features of bonus wages and their tendency to induce productivity become most apparent in an entirely different

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kind of incentive reward, namely, in the bonus given to foremen, department heads and other managerial personnel for high output of their respective departments, shops, etc; and in the bonus funds put at the disposal of the foremen for distribution at their own discretion. Without further exploiting the gratifying possibilities offered by a description of the dangers inherent in this method of bonus payments (nepotism, relentless driving of the workers and so on) we shall now quote some Soviet sources regarding those bonuses:

"In the metallurgical industry, leading technical personnel receive bonuses not only for fulfillment and overfulfillment of the monthly plans but in addition, bonuses for annual output. The director of a blast furnace shop receives a bonus in the amount of one half his annual salary in cases where the annual plan for production and lowering of production costs has been fulfilled."

(A. Stepanov, l.c., page 25)

"When the plans have been fulfilled in all departments of a plant in the armament and machine-building industries, the chief engineer and the directors of the major departments of the plant receive additional bonuses amounting to 50^{to 100} percent of their monthly salaries, and on top of that 5 to 8 percent of their basic salaries for every one percent by which the plan has been exceeded."

(A. Stepanov, l.c., page 26)

"The foreman has at his disposal a monthly fund of 1,100 to 1,200 rubles which he distributes to the workers in the form of bonuses ranging from 75 to 200 rubles."

(The Word of the Foreman, page 52)

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On page 145 of the quoted book, foreman Kruglov writes:

"To promote the best workers who attained leading positions in the socialist competition, bonuses were offered as follows:

	1st Bonus	2nd Bonus	3rd Bonus
(a) For the foreman	1,000 rubl	750 rubl	500 rubl
(b) At the disposal of the foreman for distribution	2,500 rubl	1,500 rubl	1,000 rubl

"The foremen of Stakhanovite brigades have at their disposal a fund amounting to 2 percent of the monthly payroll. This money is used to provide material incentives for the best workers in the socialist competition."

(N. Maslova: "The Stakhanovite Movement in the Industry of the Postwar Period" in Problems of Economy, 1948/7, page 45; in Russian)

The foregoing illustrations make it clear that the sole purpose of this kind of bonus is to push up production. These bonuses are paid not only to time wage earners, but also to those who receive piece wages. However, while we are not inclined to dwell only upon the bad aspects of life, one should not overlook the great dangers to which workers and employees will always be exposed by this latter kind of bonus payments, so different from those described in the beginning.

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RESTRICTEDTime Wages and Increase of Productivity

The case of the time wage earners, among whom salaried persons are of first consideration, poses a problem of greater difficulty. However, an attempt to effect greater productivity, insofar as bonus payments fail to do so, is made by "establishing a lower and an upper salary limit for technical personnel. Within the scope of this legal set-up, the director of the plant or enterprise determines the monthly salary of the technical personnel in accordance with the latter's qualifications and range of his work."

(A. Stepanov, l.c., page 24)

This rounds out the picture and makes clear that the entire wage system in the Soviet Union is dominated by the concept of increased productivity, in the present case by appealing to the materialistic drives of the workers. Before giving a likewise sketchy description of the effects of these wage policies, a word about remunerations paid in Soviet agriculture. Limited space prohibiting a presentation of wage conditions in that field, let it be stated only that here, too, the concept of increased productivity is foremost in the minds of the leaders, and that the ways and means of achieving it, except for certain deviations arising from the specific character of agricultural labor, are on the whole the same as those in industry.

The Effects of Promoting the Materialistic Drives
under the Concept of Increased Productivity

The outspoken catering to materialistic drives in the struggle for increased productivity, in the narrower as well as in the broader

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meaning of the term, has led to enormous disparities of incomes in the Soviet Union. Computing monthly income on the basis of the hourly wages quoted in the first part of this paper (illustration 2), we arrive at the following scale of incomes:

Differentiation of Monthly Gross Wages,
Computed for 208 Working Hours, at 100%
Fulfillment of the Norm (in rubles)

	Wage Groups							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Time wages	145.6	176.8	212.16	260.0	312.0	364.0	436.8	524.16
Piece wages	166.4	208.0	239.2	291.2	353.6	416.0	520.0	603.20
Piece wages for heavy labor	208.0	249.6	301.6	364.0	436.8	520.0	624.0	748.8

A tremendous difference, indeed, whether the monthly income amounts to 145.6 rubles or to 748.8 or even 1,040 rubles, the incomes being computed on the basis of the hourly rates of 5.00 rubles and 208 hours per month, as shown by Stepanov. This discrepancy is only slightly balanced by the extra monthly payments which were added to salaries of up to 900 rubles, necessitated in 1946 by rising prices of rationed food items, not to mention that for all we know those extra payments may no longer exist today, as several price reductions have been carried out since that time.

The disparities in income are even more trenchant when we regard the results of the various kinds of wages as described in the

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foregoing paragraphs. A Stakhanovite earns per month:

1,050 rubles	2,500 rubles
1,100 rubles	8,000 to 10,000 rubles
1,700 rubles	

- (1) Trud, 28 July 1949; (2) The Word of the Foreman, page 33;
 (3) Tägliche Rundschau, 4 March 1950; (4) The Word of the Foreman,
 page 39; (5) Tägliche Rundschau, 18 January 1949)

When we compare 255.6 rubles (the lowest rate in the quoted table, plus extra pay) with 10,000 rubles, we find that the coal cutter Postukhov earns about 40 times as much as an unskilled time wage earner. If he is a Hero of Socialist Labor, he doesn't even have to pay income taxes, which are on a sliding scale and under normal conditions drain off a part of the high wages.

Despite the scanty statistics derived from Soviet information, it can be seen that some incomes in the Soviet Union far exceed the average, while the toiling masses, presumably belonging to wage groups 1 to 4, have incomes so low that other members of their families are forced to work in order to make a living. (A comparison of real wages and prices could prove this point at any time).

The strata of better-paid persons contains government and party officials, army officers, engineers, technicians, executives, artists, scientists, and others. The average income for engineers and technicians in 1944 was as follows:

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Coal industry, per month	1,502.00 rubles
Metallurgical industry, per month	1,725.00 rubles

(A. Lyapin, l.c., page 19)

Top administrative and technical personnel earn the following salaries:

Department heads in:

Metallurgical plants	1,700 to 2,100 rubles
Shift leaders	1,100 to 1,450 rubles
Foremen	1,000 to 1,300 rubles

According to John Baker White's article, "How's Business in Russia," in The Atlantic, April 1949, the following monthly salaries are earned:

	Rubles
Doctor of History, Academy of Sciences	8000
Star clown	6000
Chief engineer	4000
Average mine worker	2000
School teacher	1200
Shock brigade textile worker, skilled stainer	1200
Electrical fitter	900
Unskilled sawmill worker	500
Stoker	260

These data, gleaned from various sources and corroborating each other, show the barriers which today are again being erected to divide the citizens of the Soviet Union. Whether the principle of

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an increased productivity is the only cause for this, or whether other motives also play their part, must remain an open question. There are, in the Soviet Union as in every other country, the rich and the poor -- those who give orders and those who are ordered around. While the old classes have been abolished, new classes are springing up. And though they are not permitted to own machines and factories, they are, by virtue of their power and possessions, as widely set apart from the rank and file Soviet Citizen as an old-time capitalist was from a worker. The range of the disparities prevailing among Soviet citizens, or rather, in terms of Soviet judgment, the varying evaluation of human performance, is also shown by the survivors benefits granted in certain cases on a scale out of all proportion to the income of the small wage earner.

On the death of Marshal Rybalko, his wife	
received a lump sum payment of	100,000 rbl
a lifetime pension per month of	2,000 rbl

(Trud, 19 August 1948)

Upon the death of the Stalin-Prize winner ²⁵	
actor, Tarkhanov, his wife received a	
lump sum payment of	15,000 rbl
a lifetime pension of	750 rbl
his son a lump sum payment of	5,000 rbl

(Trud, 19 August 1948)

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Upon the death of the designer Deptyanov,
 his wife received a lump sum payment of 50,000 rbl
 a lifetime pension per month of 3,000 rbl

(Pravda, 18 January 1949)

Upon the death of the architect ^C Shuzhev,
 his wife received a lump sum payment of 15,000
 a lifetime pension, according to
 V.O. of 28 December 1943;
 his son Peter a lifetime monthly pension of 500 rbl
 his daughter Lydia, likewise, monthly for life 500 rbl

(Pravda, 26 May 1949)

The foregoing data are a few illustrations to show to what extent the principle of equal rights and an equal start for all has been abandoned; how else is one to interpret the fact that 500 rubles a month are paid for life to the privileged child of an artist, architect, etc, offering the beneficiary, without any merit of his own, all kinds of advantages in social, educational and other respects which are withheld from the children of average Soviet citizens.

The principle of material betterment as a stimulus to production in the Soviet Union has decidedly -- though perhaps not exclusively -- contributed to the abandonment of the old goals of the labor movement, namely, equalization of economic and social conditions, elimination of all privileges, equal subsistence minimum, etc. It is indeed notable that we encounter here a development

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which progresses steadily in a direction contrary to the one which might be expected of a social order which -- or so the Soviet claim -- is in the stage of transition from socialism to the highest form of communism.

IDEOLOGICAL WAYS AND MEANS OF INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY

Socialist Competition

We have dwelt in detail on the materialistic drives as compared to other means of increasing productivity because the catering to those drives doubtlessly occupies first place in the Soviet system of increasing output; indeed, they have left their mark on the entire wage system of the Soviet Union. This, however, does not mean that other methods of increasing output are excluded. As may be expected in an authoritarian system, ideological indoctrination and force are also employed. The respective effectiveness of these three factors, and which one of them will be decisive in the end, depends entirely upon the nature of the individuals concerned. This much, however, can be said: only all three factors combined constitute the essence of the Soviet system of wages and labor, and only all three together, under the conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union, may eventually to some extent bring about the desired increase in output. Much could be said about ideological indoctrination and the use of force, but space limitations require conciseness.

The new economic conditions, the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, the awareness of the worker that he

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no longer toils for the capitalist exploiter, but directly for society, i.e., for himself, are supposed to create a new, socialist attitude with respect to labor as well as to all other phases of life. It is the contention of the Soviet leaders that with the development and strengthening of the socialist society and with the expansion of economy and technology this new socialist attitude with towards labor will also continue to grow, eventually becoming the sole foundation of the classless society, superseding all other drives such as materialistic stimuli and disciplinary measures.

Since the abolition of private ownership of the means of production had also eliminated competition and the struggle for personal gain, which up to that time had been the main incentives for continued progress, a new stimulant had to be found. This end was served by the socialist competition in combination with materialistic drives and disciplinary measures. Its greatest elaboration and importance was achieved by socialist competition in the form of the "All-Union Competition" which came into being during the war years and maintains its significance to this day.

"Its main characteristic is that collectives and individual workers carry out the competition according to conditions determined by the Soviet Government in collaboration with the trade unions. The results of all the collectives and the best individual workers are compared. The competition becomes general, its publicity reaches the highest peak. The best collectives and workers are awarded All-Union orders, ^{transferable} banners ~~to carry on excursions~~, union trophies . . . outstanding workers win the title 'Hero of Socialist Labor' . . ."

(N. Maslova, l.c., page 39)

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These phrases -- what else do they mean but "voluntary" obligations to make higher and higher efforts, production norms set by Stakhanovite workers -- the Soviet Henneckes --, checking of these production norms by functionaries of party and trade unions with all the evil consequences for those who cannot fulfill them; these and many other things which linger clearly and unpleasantly in the memories of all persons familiar with conditions in the Soviet Union, above all the many millions of prisoners of war.

Socialist competitions are held between ^{professions} ~~occupations~~, brigades, sections, shops, countries, etc, and are always aiming at a definite concrete goal which, changing with the changing times, is adapted to the prevailing conditions. These goals are lumped together under the designations of increase of output by greater productivity of labor, reduction of costs, and improvement in the quality of the goods produced. On the occasion of national holidays and other historical or red-letter events, it is customary to take on special obligations exceeding the usual framework of even the socialist competition.

All these features explain why the Soviet leaders put such emphasis on the socialist competition and demand the participation of all enterprises.

"We are living in a time where our workers, employees and peasants all over the country participate in socialist competition. There do not exist, nor are there permitted to exist any factories, plants or kolkhozes which fail to participate in socialist competition." (V. M. Molotov, in a speech on 11 June 1948, as quoted in Voprosy ekonomiki, 1948/7, page 9; in Russian)

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It is hard to determine to what extent participation in the socialist competition is truly "voluntary", stirred by a socialist attitude, and what percentage of it is brought about by coercion and materialistic drives. This much, however, is certain: the threat of moral compulsion and moral pressure is heavy; it forces the laborers and employees to participate in the socialist competition if they want to avoid the risk of being branded as reactionary, anti-socialist, etc.

The Stakhanov Movement

It would be erroneous to regard the Stakhanov Movement and the socialist competition as two separate phenomena.

"The significance of Stakhanovism lies in the fact that it is the expression of a new upsurge, a new and higher stage of the socialist competition."

(I. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, page 597)

Everything that was said about the socialist competition is therefore also true of Stakhanovism.

Viewed from a purely practical standpoint, the Stakhanovites set records which markedly raise the productivity of labor. The objectives, as in the socialist competition, are entirely concrete, aimed at perfecting techniques, reorganizing working procedures, etc; in short, the same tasks mentioned in connection with the socialist competition. Nearly all of the achievements of scientific labor management, as propounded in particular by Taylor, are therefore also encountered as either objectives or result of Stakhanovism.

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"Stakhanovism means efficient planning of work, relieving the skilled workers of inferior and preparatory tasks, and best possible organization of the work station."

(A. Lyapin, Labor in the Land of Socialism, page 49, in Russian)

An example of such planned work was given by the miner Alexey Stakhanov, the originator of the movement bearing his name. As a result of the reorganization of work introduced by him, 102 tons of coal were produced per shift while the norm was 7 tons.

The unquestionably great advantages of Stakhanovism with a view to an increase in productivity must, nevertheless, be regarded with serious misgivings which cannot be dispersed by merely pointing out that the record performances resulting from the increase in work intensity, which most of the time accompanies a speed-up of productivity, are put forth by the workers in their own interest, to protect the socialist achievements, or to attain some lofty, though far distant, goal. Take only the Stakhanovite movement for the operation of several machine tools at one time. In this instance, one turner will operate several lathes so that his working time is utilized 100 percent, since he is constantly on the move from one lathe to the next. A similar kind of multiple or uninterrupted operation is found in the textile industry.

"As early as the first year of the Postwar Five-Year Plan, the brigade of weaver Maria Volkova proceeded to operate several looms. Her example inspired others. At the end of 1947, 24 woman weavers were operating 16 looms each, and 75 woman weavers attended 12 looms each."

(G. Yestaf'yev, Socialist Competition--the Communist Method of Building Socialism, page 25. in Russian.)

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These illustrations, which could be multiplied at will and apply likewise to most of the other branches of Stakhanovism the movement to learn several trades, to overfulfill the work norm by a thousand or several hundred percent; to increase production and simultaneously reduce the number of workers, etc, go far to show that in all cases the increase of labor productivity is coupled with a marked increase in work intensity which cannot but have a detrimental effect on the worker's health. It is no longer a question of average effort; this is, as in sports, a matter of setting up records, of asking for the supreme effort. This system is especially open to criticism in that the intensification of work thus effected is not limited to the Stakhanovites themselves, but, as described above in the paragraphs about the work norms, affects at the same time the level of the so-called mean progressive technical work norm. The high output and resulting high income of a few individuals thus raise the output quota for the masses of the workers and lower their wage level.

INCREASE OF PRODUCTIVITY BY MEASURES OF COERCION AND INTIMIDATION

The insight that human nature doesn't change and the realization that the living conditions of the toiling masses in the Soviet Union are not satisfactory are both borne out by the fact that neither the catering to materialistic drives as it is being exercised, nor the ideological education and indoctrination alone appear sufficient to bring about the necessary results; back of the materialistic and ideological stimuli there always loom steadily growing

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coercion, force, terror and in the end severest and hardest punishment. Coercive measures find their foremost expression, to a steadily growing degree, in a prohibition of the worker for leaving his place of employment.

On 20 December 1938, the labor book was introduced; on 26 June 1940, a decree was issued prohibiting unauthorized change of the place of employment.

"This ordinance, which imposed legal punishment for absenteeism and unauthorized leaving of place of employment, effected the introduction of strict order and discipline in production."

(A. P. Lyapin, l.c., page 17)

2 October 1940: The Law on State Labor Reserves in the Soviet Union and the decree of the Council of People's Commissars pertaining to the creation of a Main Administration for Labor Reserves;

19 October 1940: Ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union decreeing that engineers, technicians, designers, foremen and skilled workers could be transferred from one enterprise to another.

These measures, designed to constrain the worker to his place of employment and only allow him to give notice in exceptional cases, were fortified by economic measures: the payment of sickness benefits, pensions, etc, were made dependent upon the length of uninterrupted employment in the same enterprise.

Hand in hand with the growing constraint of the worker to his

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place of employment, we find relentless and ever more severe labor discipline. The principle of Article 130 of the Stalin Constitution, "Every Citizen of the Soviet Union is obliged to observe the discipline of labor" was elaborated and intensified by the following legal directives:

Decree of 28 December 1938: "Severe penalties of unexcused absenteeism, for tardiness at work, etc, should strengthen . . . labor discipline."

(Bonwetsch, "Industry in the USSR," in Ostwirtschaft (Eastern Economy), 1939/12, page 148).

Ukase of the Council of People's Commissars to strengthen the leadership principle, in particular the position of the foreman: "The section foreman decides the hiring and firing of the workers. He has the right to promote the progressive comrades and punish the loafers."

(The Word of the Foreman, page 7)

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 26 June 1940: "The present regulations, according to which workers and employees who are absent from work without plausible reason will be dismissed, is rescinded. Instead, it is ordered that the offenders be brought to court and sentenced to forced labor at their present place of work, and that up to 25 percent of their wages shall be deducted for a period up to six months. Directors of departments and managers of offices are subject to punishment if they fail to report violations

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of the prohibition against absenteeism without sufficient reason ..."

(Ostwirtschaft (Eastern Economy) 40/7, page 75)

"A bill before the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated 10 July 1940 provides punishment of from 5 to 8 years in prison for the delivery of inferior or incomplete goods or products which fail to comply with the standards established for them."

(Ostwirtschaft, 1940/7, page 75)

All these ordinances, as well as Article 130 of the Constitution, lend themselves to arbitrary interpretation and application. Combined with the upgrading of the work norms, the increase in the number of work days per year, with the constraint of the worker to his place of employment, they virtually amount to the establishment of forced labor. And the figure of 6 to 9 million forced laborers in the Soviet Union, as published by the League for a Free Russia under date of 18 February 1950 (According to Adolf Weber, slave laborers number as many as 10 to 18 million: A. Weber, Market Economy and Soviet Economy, page 309), shows that the use of coercive measures is by no means the exception.

Thus, in analogy to the earlier description of the catering to materialistic drives, we must now add that the use of coercive and disciplinary methods has increased, rather than diminished, as might rightly have been expected under the ^growing stabilization of the Soviet brand of socialist society.

SUMMARY

The foregoing account of industrial wages and increase of

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productivity in the Soviet Union has pointed out the methods by which the Soviet leaders undertake to extract the maximum amount of labor from the workers. The true character of the living conditions of the toiling masses becomes glaringly evident, however, when the monetary income, that is, the nominal wage, is compared with the real wage.

Taking as a basis the food budget of a Moscow worker as published by Revue Internationale du Travail, the organ of the International Labor Bureau, 1928/18, page 691, we find that the subsistence for a working class family of four in Moscow costs 712.30 rubles even after the price reductions of March 1950. Comparing these expenditures for food only -- a West Berliner would have to spend the sum of DM 100.75 according to the cost of living index of February 1950 -- with the above given table of incomes, we realize that the income of the great mass of workers is not sufficient to feed a family, not to mention to provide for all the other necessities of life. Want and hunger thus join, as indirect factors of compulsion, with the real coercion to work as described above, which follows from the ordinances and regulations of labor policies. Husband and wife are forced to work in order to secure subsistence for their family.

This account of labor and wage conditions in the Soviet Union makes it evident that the worker there is exposed to severe burdens and threats combined with a standard of living that is disproportionately low in comparison with the standard of living of labor in pre-war Russia as well as in the Western nations.

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